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To fully understand Liddell Hart's indirect approach, it is helpful to have an appreciation for his background. Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart (1895 Hart ( -1970 was, like many Englishmen of his generation, greatly influenced by the horrors of World War I. He had finished his first year at Cambridge when World War I began; he volunteered to serve in the army and was sent to France as a lieutenant in the infantry. 2 He was assigned to the front three times, the last in the Somme offensive of 1916 where he was subjected to a poisonous gas attack.
He was also a first-hand witness to the British loss of sixty thousand soldiers in one day.
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The tremendous loss of life in static warfare colored his interwar writings. He dedicated himself to advancing a means to win a war without catastrophic loss of life, leading to his support for an indirect approach to warfare. A prolific writer, he had a tremendous reputation in England until World War II, when many of his policy recommendations were proven wrong. It wasn't until the 1960s that he was again recognized as a brilliant strategist. 4 While his interwar policy prescriptions were proven wrong and adversely affected his reputation, his writing on the objectives of war and grand strategy were sound.
Liddell Hart believed the objective of war is to subdue the enemy's will to resist, "with the least possible human and economic loss to itself." 5 With this aim, the destruction of the enemy's armed forces is only a potential (but not inevitable) means to attaining the goal.
Hart believed that all means-military, economic, diplomatic-could be used, the most suitable means would be the quickest, most economic path to victory with the least 
Means to the Objective
Hart believed that one had to overcome the enemy's will to resist to achieve victory.
This was done by the "fact or threat of making life so unpleasant and difficult for the people that they will comply with your terms rather than endure this misery." 7 Like Sun Tzu, he believed the perfection of strategy would produce victory without even fighting. For Hart,
to win a war in this manner one needed to achieve psychological dislocation of the enemy which would occur when the commander of the opposing force felt trapped. It often results from taking the line of least expectation. When combined with physical dislocation (achieved by upsetting enemy dispositions, endangering his supplies and reducing his ability to move/retreat), the strategy is truly an indirect approach. 8 In short, the indirect approach is aimed at the enemy's will to resist, which is shaken by psychological and physical dislocation.
To achieve dislocation, Liddell Hart believed that for a modern nation at war, its industrial resources, communications, and command centers were the "Achilles' heel."
Therefore, during the inter-war period Hart espoused air power as a unique way to target the will of the people, although he cited two cautions. First, crippling the enemy's industry 6 Ibid., 20. that the air campaign was concluded sooner than a ground campaign could have begun.
Since one of Hart's primary concerns was that air power might end up in a "prolonged war of attrition," the short war over Kosovo would likely have been well-received. More germane to this situation, however, is the fact that NATO ruled out ground forces at the outset, which set up air power's indirect approach.
The air war against Serbia represented an indirect approach because it exploited a dimension-the air-that could be totally denied to the enemy. There was never a question of effective enemy air attacks because Milosevic's offensive capability was rapidly eliminated. However, there was a concern over defensive SAM and AAA threats which the Serbs chose to conserve as a means of delaying defeat. Overall though, the enemy was unable to respond against NATO's force. To Hart, making the enemy leadership feel they are unable to counter an opponent's move was critical to psychological dislocation.
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Unfortunately, due to the phased and limited targeting during the first month, it does not appear that psychological or physical dislocation of the enemy occurred. Instead, there was a sense of defiance from Milosevic and his people, and Milosevic stepped up the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Indeed, this was an indirect response by Milosevic, aimed at creating a humanitarian disaster that would strain the NATO alliance. By avoiding direct engagement with NATO forces, Serbia hoped that either Russian intervention or divisions in the NATO alliance would avoid defeat. Additionally, he hoped that Serbian civilian casualties would erode American public support for the operation.
Once NATO approved a more aggressive campaign with less targeting restrictions, there is evidence that physical and psychological dislocation did occur. Secretary Cohen concluded that the air attacks made the Serbian forces hide under cover which made them ineffective as a tactical maneuver force. 25 He also concluded that the mounting damage combined with Milosevic's "utter inability to cause any notable damage or casualties to NATO forces, had a major impact on Milosevic's decision" [to acquiesce] 26 As previously mentioned, his own people were demonstrating in the streets. Additionally, Milosevic had been named as a war criminal, and the only sure-fire way to avoid prosecution was to remain in power. Declaring him a war criminal probably aided in psychological dislocation, but complicated the end state. Once it became clear that neither world opinion, a crack in NATO, nor Russian anger would bring a halt to the campaign, his resolve was broken. All of this represents an indirect way of defeating his objectives, forces, and ultimately his will.
Much ado has been made about the gradual escalation and extremely (and high-level) 
Prospect for the Future
It is possible to draw some early conclusions about what the conflict will mean in future wars. Stealth and precision combined to allow penetration of integrated air defenses and the delivery of cheap, precise weapons (JDAMs cost less than $20,000 each while delivering ten meter accuracy). With unmanned aerial vehicles to fix targets, we will be able to improve our ability to precisely find, fix, and target industrial, communication, and transportation targets with little collateral damage.
It is almost beyond comprehension that NATO did not sustain any casualties in the war.
As long as the United States enjoys overwhelming air power superiority, it is likely that our political leaders will expect friendly casualties to be low. This expectation, backed by our experience in the 1990s, might increase the likelihood of choosing the military option. It Therefore, because of the speed with which air power can deploy to a region, employ with cost-effective precision weapons, and secure military objectives with seemingly few or no casualties, it seems likely that Liddell Hart's strategy of the indirect approach will see wider application in the future. Like Kosovo, political leaders will likely demand close control over target selection. In a limited war, they may insist on gradual escalation (something the Air Force opposes and which met decidedly mixed reviews in Kosovo). As long as we have air supremacy, this approach will probably work although it may hamper effectiveness. At the end of the day, it appears that air power can finally address Hart's World War II era concerns over its use in the indirect approach. Even so, we still have some work to do in connecting our military strategy to our grand strategy.
